We present a general framework for efficient, universally composable oblivious transfer (OT) protocols in which a single, global, common reference string (CRS) can be used for multiple invocations of oblivious transfer by arbitrary pairs of parties. In addition:
• Our resulting protocols are more efficient than any known previously, and in particular yield protocols for string OT using O(1) exponentiations and communicating O(1) group elements.
Our result improves on that of Peikert 
Introduction
In this work we study the construction of efficient protocols for universally composable (UC) [Can01] oblivious transfer (OT). Our work is motivated by the fact that, although UC commitments are complete for UC multiparty computation [CLOS02] , the most efficient multiparty computation protocols (e.g., [LP11, LOP11] ) rely on universally composable OT as a building block. Relative to UC commitments (see [Lin11, FLM11] and references therein), however, universally composable OT has received less attention.
There is a long series of work on efficient OT protocols in the stand-alone setting (e.g., [NP01, AIR01, HK12, Lin08]). Lindell [Lin09] (also [IPS08, Appendix A]) gave a generic transformation from static security to adaptive security (assuming erasure) that applied in the semi-honest setting and the stand-alone malicious setting, but not in the UC setting.
Constructions of UC oblivious transfer from general assumptions were given in [CLOS02] ; these constructions are relatively inefficient. Garay, MacKenzie, and Yang [GMY04] constructed a constant-round protocol for committed OT under the DDH and strong RSA assumptions. Their protocol yields bit OT rather than string OT, so results in protocols for string OT with complexity linear in the length of the sender's inputs. Jarecki and Shmatikov show a four-round protocol for committed string OT under the decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption [JS07] . A round-optimal OT protocol appears in [HK07] .
The most efficient known protocol for UC oblivious transfer is that of Peikert et al. [PVW08] . Their work, however, has several disadvantages. First, it requires an independent common reference string 1 (CRS) for every party in the network or, equivalently, a single CRS of length linear in the number of parties. (Any pair of parties can then run the protocol of Peikert et al. using the CRS of the receiver.) Their protocols also only achieve security against a static adversary who decides which parties to corrupt before the protocol begins (and even before the CRS is chosen). They do not handle an adaptive adversary who may choose which parties to corrupt during the course of the protocol execution.
Garay et al. [GWZ09] constructed efficient UC oblivious-transfer protocols that address both the above-mentioned drawbacks. In their constructions, the parties run a coin-tossing protocol whose outcome is then used as a common random string for an OT protocol. Since the resulting schemes are not explicitly described in the literature, we do so in Appendix A. This approach is not entirely satisfactory. First, it increases the overall computation, communication, and round complexity; second, it can (in general) only be instantiated with OT protocols that work in the common random string model rather than the more general common reference string model. Choi et al. [CDMW09b, CDMW09a] showed other approaches for obtaining adaptively secure, constantround UC oblivious transfer.
Our Results
Here, we present a new framework for constructing UC oblivious-transfer protocols that require only a single, global CRS. We aim for efficient protocols having low round complexity, and incurring only constant computation and communication even when the sender's inputs are long strings. We are also interested in achieving adaptive security, under the assumption that parties erase portions of their local state that are no longer needed. (Note, however, that the works of [CDMW09b, GWZ09, CDMW09a] Protocols with adaptive security (assuming erasure). Our framework is fairly general and can be instantiated from several assumptions. Specifically:
• We obtain efficient, round-optimal OT protocols with static security under the decisional linear (DLIN) [BBS04] or symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumptions [Sco02, BBS04] . These protocols can be modified to achieve adaptive security (assuming erasure) with one additional round and a slight increase in communication and computation.
• We obtain efficient, four-round OT protocols under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) or DCR [Pai99] assumptions. Our basic constructions achieve static security, and we present variants that are secure against adaptive corruptions (assuming erasure) without any additional rounds, but with a slight increase in communication and computation.
We compare our constructions with previous work in Table 1 2 Overview of our constructions. The starting point of our approach is the Halevi-Kalai construction [HK12] of 2-round OT based on smooth projective hashing. Their construction only achieves indistinguishability-based security (and not even stand-alone simulation-based security) against a malicious receiver. We show how to overcome this with the following modifications:
1. We require the receiver to commit to its input using CCA-secure encryption.
2 The numbers for the adaptively secure protocol of [PVW08] Table 1 are based on a preliminary version of [Lin11] , and could change once the author publishes the fix to a bug in the protocol.
2. The receiver proves in zero knowledge that it is behaving consistently in the underlying OT protocol (with respect to the input it committed to).
A similar high-level approach was taken in [HK07] , but using generic simulation-sound noninteractive zero knowledge [DDO + 01]. Here, following recent constructions of efficient UC commitments [Lin11, FLM11] , we rely instead on efficient zero-knowledge protocols that admit straight-line simulation in the CRS model. In particular, for our two-round OT protocols we instantiate the underlying zero-knowledge proofs using Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08] , as in [FLM11] . For our four-round OT protocols, we rely on Damgård's three-round zero-knowledge proof system [Dam00] .
Achieving adaptive security. To achieve adaptive security, we first modify our protocols so the final message is sent over an adaptively secure channel (cf. functionality F smt in [Can01] ). The latter can be realized at low cost if erasure is assumed [BH92] . With this modification, security against adaptive corruption of the sender is achieved automatically by simply having the sender erase its local state at appropriate times. In our two-round protocols, security against adaptive corruption of the receiver is similarly achieved. For our 4-round protocols, we use techniques similar to those in [Lin11, FLM11] . Unlike this prior work, however, we do not introduce any additional overhead in communication or round complexity. (We incur a modest increase in computational cost.)
Organization
We review preliminaries in Section 2. Our general framework and concrete instantiations for tworound OT is described in Sections 3 and 4, and for four-round OT in Sections 5 and 6.
Preliminaries
Let λ be the security parameter. For a set S, we let x ← S denote choosing x uniformly at random from S. For a randomized algorithm A, we let y←A(x) denote running A(x; r) with r chosen uniformly at random.
Ideal Functionalities
The ideal OT functionality F MOT described in Figure 1 is a reformulation of the multi-session OT functionality in [Can01] . The CRS functionality in Figure 2 is a reformulation of that in [Can07] .
Smooth Projective Hash Proof Systems
We recall the notion of a hard subset membership problem and smooth projective hashing defined by Cramer and Shoup [CS02] , following the notation of [HK12] . A hash family H consists of the following PPT algorithms:
• The parameter-generator HashPG(1 λ )→pp. We assume that the security parameter λ can be inferred from pp. Let λ(pp) denote the security parameter corresponding to pp.
Functionality F MOT
F MOT interacts with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and an adversary Sim, and proceeds as follows:
Upon receiving an input (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j , m 0 , m 1 ) from P i with m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} , record the tuple ssid, P i , P j , m 0 , m 1 , and reveal (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) to the adversary. Ignore further (send, . . .) inputs with the same ssid from P i .
Upon receiving an input (receive, sid, ssid, P i , P j , b) from P j with b ∈ {0, 1}, record the tuple ssid, P i , P j , b , and reveal (receive, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) to the adversary. Ignore further (receive, . . .) inputs with the same ssid from P j .
Upon receiving a message (sent, sid, ssid, P i , P j , P i ) from the adversary, ignore the message if ssid, P i , P j , m 0 , m 1 or ssid, P i , P j , b is not recorded; Otherwise, return (sent, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) to P i ; Ignore further (sent, sid, ssid, P i , P j , P i ) messages from the adversary.
Upon receiving a message (received, sid, ssid, P i , P j , P j ) from the adversary, ignore the message if ssid, P i , P j , m 0 , m 1 or ssid, P i , P j , b is not recorded; Otherwise, return (received, sid, ssid, P i , P j , m b ) to P j ; Ignore further (received, sid, ssid, P i , P j , P j ) messages from the adversary. Upon receiving an input (crs, sid) from P , sid = (P, sid ) where P is a set of identities, and P ∈ P; else ignore the input. Next if there is no value crs recorded then choose crs←D() and record it. Send (crs, sid, crs, P ) to S; when receiving (crs-return, sid) from S, send (crs-return, sid, crs) to P . CRS functionality for common reference string.
• A pair of disjoint sets Λ yes and Λ no are associated to pp corresponding to yes and no instances respectively. There exists a yes instance-sampler SampYes(pp)→(x, w) where x is uniformly distributed over Λ yes and w is the corresponding witness. There also exists a no instance-sampler SampNo(pp)→x where x is uniformly distributed over Λ no .
• The hash-key generator HashKG(pp)→(hk, pk). Here hk is the primary hashing key and pk is a projective key.
• The primary hash algorithm Hash(hk, x)→y for all x ∈ Λ yes ∪ Λ no .
• The secondary (projection) hash algorithm pHash(pk, x, w)→y for all (x, w) ← SampYes(pp).
Definition 1 A family H = (HashPG, SampYes, SampNo, HashKG, Hash, pHash) is a smooth projective hash family if for every pp ∈ support(HashPG), the following holds:
Correctness:
Pr[(hk, pk)←HashKG(pp); (x, w)←SampYes(pp) : pHash(pk, x, w) = Hash(hk, x) ] = 1.
Smoothness: Let (hk, pk)←HashKG(pp). For all x ∈ Λ no , the distribution of Hash(hk, x) given pk is statistically close to uniform. That is, the statistical difference between the following two distributions is negligible in λ(pp).
where Γ denotes the set of possible hash values with parameter pp.
Definition 2 A smooth projective hash family H = (HashPG, SampYes, SampNo, HashKG, Hash, pHash) is said to have a hard subset membership property if the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
Dual-Mode NIZK
Groth introduced composable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [Gro06] . In this work, we sometimes call these proofs as dual-mode NIZK proofs. In the system, a common reference string crs is generated in one of two modes called soundness mode and zero knowledge (ZK) mode. It is required that given the crs, no efficient adversary can distinguish between the modes. In addition, when crs is generated in soundness mode, the proof system is statistically sound. On the other hand, when crs is generated in ZK mode, the simulation is perfect. Groth and Sahai [GS08] provide efficient dual mode NIZK proofs for various equations in bilinear groups.
Definition 3 A non-interactive proof system for a language L ∈ N P consists of three algorithms (K, P, V) where K is a CRS generation algorithm, P and V are a prover and a verifier algorithm respectively. The system is required to satisfy the following properties:
Completeness: For any λ, any x ∈ L, and any witness w for x, it holds that
Adaptive soundness: For any λ and any adversary A, it holds that
Definition 4 A non-interactive proof system (K, P, V) for a language L ∈ N P is said to be dualmode NIZK if there is a pair of efficient algorithms (S 1 , S 2 ) such that for any λ ∈ N and for all non-uniform polynomial time adversary A, it holds the following:
Indistinguishability of modes:
Perfect simulation in ZK mode: The following two probabilities are equal.
Here, A has to generate a valid pair (x, w), i.e., w should be a witness for x.
Labeled CCA-Secure Encryption
We use the standard notion of chosen-ciphertext security for public-key encryption supporting labels [CS03] .
Definition 5 A labeled public-key encryption scheme consists of three PPT algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
• The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1 λ returns a public key pk and a secret key sk .
• The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a public key pk , a label L, and a message m. It returns a ciphertext C←Enc L pk (m).
• The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a secret key sk , a label L, and a ciphertext C. It returns a message m or a distinguished symbol ⊥. We write this as m = Dec
We require that for any label L ∈ {0, 1} * and any m in the message space, it should hold that
Our definition of security against chosen-ciphertext attacks is standard except for our inclusion of labels. In the following, we define a left-or-right encryption oracle LR pk ,β (·, ·, ·) with β ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
Definition 6 A labeled public-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA-secure) if for any non-uniform PPT algorithms A, it holds that |2p − 1| = negl(λ) where
Here, A's queries are restricted as follows: if A makes a query LR pk ,β (L, m 0 , m 1 ) then |m 0 | = |m 1 |; furthermore, if A receives ciphertext C in response to a query with label L, then A cannot later query Dec sk (L, C); however, it is allowed to query Dec sk (L , C) with L = L .
Σ-Protocols
A Σ-protocol is a 3-round honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol. We denote by (a, e, z) the messages exchanged between the prover P Σ and the verifier V Σ . Please see Figure 3 . We say that a transcript (a, e, z) is an accepting transcript for x if the protocol instructs V Σ to accept based on the values (x, a, e, z). Formally:
Definition 7 A protocol is a Σ-protocol for relation R if it is a three-round public-coin protocol and the following requirements hold:
Completeness: If P Σ and V Σ follow the protocol on input x and private input w to P Σ where (x, w) ∈ R, then V Σ always accepts.
Special soundness: There exists a polynomial-time algorithm A that given any x and any pair of accepting transcripts (a, e, z), (a, e , z ) for x where e = e , outputs w s.t. (x, w) ∈ R.
Special honest verifier zero knowledge: There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S Σ , which on input x and e outputs a transcript of the form (a, e, z) with the same probability distribution as transcripts between the honest P Σ and V Σ on common input x. Formally, for every x and w such that (x, w) ∈ R and every e ∈ support(V Σ (x)) it holds that
where S Σ (x, e) denotes the output of simulator S Σ upon input x and e, and view V Σ P Σ (x, w), V Σ (x, e) denotes the view of V Σ of an execution between P Σ and V Σ , where P Σ has input (x, w), V Σ has input x, and V Σ 's random tape (determining its query) equals e.
Equivocal Commitments
We define equivocal commitment scheme as follows:
Definition 8 Let (K com , Com) be a non-interactive commitment scheme with CRS where K com is a CRS generation algorithm, and Com is a commitment algorithm. The scheme is said to be equivocal if there exists a tuple of PPT algorithm (S com1 , S com2 , S com3 ) that satisfies the following properties:
Computational binding: Let M and R be the message space and the randomness space implicitly defined by the commitment scheme. For any λ ∈ N, and any non-uniform polynomial time adversary A the following probability is negligible in λ: Indistinguishability of modes:
Equivocality: For any λ ∈ N, any (crs, t) ∈ support(S com1 (1 λ )), and any adversary A, the following distributions are identical.
-m←A(crs); r←R; c = Com crs (m; r) : (m, r, c)
A Family of Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
λ with a polynomial is a family of collision-resistant hash functions if for any non-uniform PPT algorithm A, it holds that
3 A Generic Framework for Two-Round OT (Protocol 1 * )
Let (K, P, V) be a dual-mode NIZK proof system, (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a CCA-secure labeled publickey encryption scheme, and H = (HashPG, SampYes, SampNo, HashKG, Hash, pHash) be a smooth hash proof system with a hard subset membership property. We assume for simplicity that {0, 1} is the range of the hash functions in H; known constructions can be modified to achieve this property.
Based on these components, we construct an OT protocol between a sender P i and a receiver P j in the CRS model; refer also to Figure 4 .
Common reference string: Compute pp←HashPG(1 λ ), (pk , sk )←Gen(1 λ ), and crs nizk ←K(1 λ ). The common reference string is crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ).
Oblivious transfer: The protocol starts by having the receiver, holding selection bit b, send two instances (x 0 , x 1 ) for the hash proof system H with x 1−b a no-instance; the receiver sends Enc pk (b) and a NIZK proof that x 1−b is a no-instance as well. In the second round, for σ ∈ {0, 1} the sender generates primary and projection hash keys (hk σ , pk σ ) and sends (pk σ , Hash(hk σ , x σ )⊕m σ ) to the receiver. The receiver recovers m b in the standard way. In more detail:
• On input a selection bit b, the receiver P j proceeds as follows:
1. Generate yes and no instances according to the input b, i.e., (x b , w)←SampYes(pp) and
• On input m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} , and after receiving the first-round message x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π from the receiver, the sender P i proceeds as follows:
1. If the proof π does not verify, abort.
2. For σ ∈ {0, 1} compute (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp) and Z σ = m σ ⊕ Hash(hk σ , x σ ).
3. Send pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 to P j .
• Upon receiving the second-round message pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 , the receiver P j computes the output
Informally, security against a malicious sender holds because the sender cannot guess the receiver's selection bit from (x 0 , x 1 ) due to the hard subset membership property. On the other hand, a malicious receiver gets no information about m 1−b if x 1−b is a no-instance, and this property is enforced by the NIZK proof.
Theorem 1 Say (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme, (HashPG, SampYes, SampNo, HashKG, Hash, pHash) is a smooth projective hash proof system with a hard subset membership property, and (K, P, V) is a dual-mode NIZK proof system. Then the protocol described above securely realizes F MOT in the F CRS -hybrid model, for static corruptions.
Here, we give an informal overview of the proof. The simulator works as follows:
• The simulator sets the CRS crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ). It generates pp honestly. For the public key pk , it additionally keeps the corresponding secret key sk . For crs nizk , it runs the CRS generation algorithm in the ZK mode rather than in the soundness mode.
• In simulating an honest sender against a malicious receiver, it uses the secret key sk to decrypt the encryption Φ and extract the receiver's inputb (and thereby mb from the OT functionality). It sets the honest sender's m 1−b to 0 .
• In simulating an honest receiver against a malicious sender, it generates (x 0 , x 1 ) where both are yes-instances; additionally, Φ = E(0), and π is simulated. Given the sender messages, it extracts the sender input (m 0 , m 1 ) using the witnesses for (x 0 , x 1 ).
erase all state except (b, w, X, π) Indistinguishability is shown by going over the following hybrids:
• H 0 : Real execution.
• H 1 : The simulator sets up the CRS in such a way that it knows the decryption key for pk. When the receiver is corrupted, the simulator decrypts Φ to obtainb and switches the honest sender's m 1−b to 0 . Indistinguishability follows from the soundness of the proof π and smoothness of the hash proof system.
• H 2 : The simulator generates crs nizk in the ZK mode.
• H 3 : When interacting with a corrupted sender, the simulator generates a simulated proof π. Indistinguishability follows from the zero-knowledge property of the proof system.
• H 4 : When interacting with a corrupted sender, the simulator sets Φ to an encryption of 0. Indistinguishability follows from the CCA security of the encryption scheme.
• H 5 : When interacting with a corrupted sender, the simulator generates both (x 0 , x 1 ) as yes instances. Indistinguishability follows from the hard subset membership property.
• H 6 : When interacting with a corrupted sender, the simulator uses witnesses for (x 0 , x 1 ) to extract (m 0 , m 1 ). H 5 and H 6 are identically distributed.
A full proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 3.1.
The protocol as described is secure against static corruptions. Interestingly, it achieves adaptive security if the second round message is sent over a secure channel, and parties can erase portions of their local state at the appropriate times. Namely, before sending the message (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π), the receiver erases all its internal state except the information needed (i.e., the input b and the witness w for x b as well as (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π)) to later compute the output. Before sending the message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ), the sender erases all its internal state except its input (m 0 , m 1 ) and the message. The details are in Figure 4 .
Theorem 2 Under the same assumptions as Theorem 1, the protocol described in Figure 4 , where the second round message is sent over a secure channel, securely realizes F MOT in the F CRS -hybrid model, for adaptive corruptions (assuming erasure).
The proof appears in Section 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let Π denote the OT protocol under consideration. To show the security of the protocol, we need to construct a simulator Sim for any non-uniform ppt environment Z such that exec
where A is the dummy adversary. We first construct a simulator and then argue the indistinguishability between the two ensembles.
Let (S 1 , S 2 ) be the simulator for the dual-mode NIZK proof system (K, P, V).
The Simulator
Initialization step: The simulator Sim generates the common reference string as follows:
4. Set crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ).
Simulating the communication with Z: Upon receiving an input value from Z, the simulator Sim writes it on A's input tape (as if coming from Z); upon obtaining an output value from A, the simulator Sim writes it on Z's output tape (as if coming from A).
Case 1: Simulating honest receiver P j with honest sender P i :
1. Upon receiving (receive, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from the functionality F MOT , the simulator delivers A a first round message (sid, ssid, M 1 ) that intends to send from P j to P i , where
which is generated as follows:
Generate two yes instances, i.e, (x 0 , w 0 ) ← SampYes(pp), (x 1 , w 1 ) ← SampYes(pp), and record (w 0 , w 1 ). Compute a dummy ciphertext Φ ← Enc pk (0), and then obtain a simulated proof π by using the simulator S 2 for the NIZK, i.e., compute
2. Upon receiving (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from functionality F MOT , and the first round message has been delivered from P j to P i , the simulator Sim then sets m 0 = m 1 = 0 , and computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕ Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}, and generates a second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 ) that it intends to send from P i to P j , where M 2 = (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ). The second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 ) is then delivered to A.
Case 2: Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i :
2. Upon receiving a second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 ) from the adversary A that intends to send from P i to P j , where
Case 3: Simulating corrupted receiver P j with honest sender P i :
1. Upon receiving a first round message (sid, ssid, M 1 ) from A that it intends to send from P j to P i , where
, the simulator Sim first verifies if π is valid. If the verification fails, then Sim aborts; otherwise, Sim decrypts Φ intob, i.e.,b = Dec
2. Upon receiving (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from functionality F MOT , the simulator Sim then sends (receive, sid, ssid, P i , P j ,b) to the ideal functionality F MOT in the name of dummy receiver and obtains (received, sid, ssid, P i , P j , mb). Set m 1−b = 0 . Then the simulator computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends a second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 ) to A that it intends to send from P i to P j , where
Case 4: Simulating corrupted receiver P j with corrupted sender P i : This is the trivial case. Now the simulator Sim just runs A internally. Note that now A itself generates the messages between the sender and the receiver.
Indistinguishability
Here we show by hybrid arguments that exec
Since the case in which both players are corrupted (or honest) is easy (i.e., Case 1 and 4), we here ignore the analysis for those two cases and focus the remaining two difficult cases: honest receiver with corrupted sender, and honest sender with corrupted receiver. Here, We highlight the main features of each hybrid.
• H 1 : When simulating honest senders, the simulator decrypts Φ from a corrupted receiver to obtainb and switches the honest sender's m 1−b to 0 .
• H 2 : Use a simulated crs nizk .
• H 3 : In simulating honest receivers, the simulator generates a simulated proof π.
• H 4 : In simulating honest receivers, the simulator sends a dummy encryption Φ = Enc(0).
• H 5 : In simulating honest receivers, the simulator generates (x 0 , x 1 ) with both yes instances.
• H 6 : In simulating honest receivers, the simulator uses witnesses for (x 0 , x 1 ) to extract (m 0 , m 1 ) from a dishonest sender.
Hybrid H 1 : In this hybrid, when the environment feeds inputs, the input of an honest receiver is magically forwarded to the simulator Sim 1 . The simulator Sim 1 generates CRS, and simulates the behavior of all the honest parties. At the end of the protocol execution, the output from Sim 1 (as an honest party) is forwarded to Z.
In simulating the behavior of honest receivers, Sim 1 executes the protocol Π with the adversary A, simply following the protocol specification using the magically given input; however, the input to an honest sender will be suppressed as in the ideal world, and more care is necessary.
Simulation of CRS.
As in H 0 . However, the simulator Sim 1 stores the secret key sk for the CCA-secure cryptosystem in order to use it later.
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . As in H 0 .
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . The simulator Sim 1 as P i just follows the protocol description except the following:
• Upon receiving a first round message (sid, ssid, M 1 ) from A that it intends to send from P j to P i , where
• Upon receiving (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from functionality F MOT , the simulator Sim then sends (receive, sid, ssid, P i , P j ,b) to the ideal functionality F MOT in the name of dummy receiver and obtains (received, sid, ssid, P i , P j , mb). The simulator sets
It sends a second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 ) to A that it intends to send from P i to P j , where
We claim that the hybrids H 0 and H 1 are statistically indistinguishable. The proof proceeds via a case analysis:
Case (I). The proof π is accepting, the ciphertext Φ correctly decrypts to some valueb ∈ {0, 1}, and x 1−b is a yes instance. By adaptive soundness of the proof system (K, P, V), this happens with negligible probability (over crs nizk and the coin tosses of Z).
Case (II).
The proof π is not accepting. In this case, the sender in both H 0 and H 1 will abort, so H 0 and H 1 are identically distributed.
Case (III).
The proof π is accepting and x 1−b is a no instance. In this case, the only difference between the distributions H 0 and H 1 is that in H 0 , Z 1−b is honestly generated based on the real plaintext m 1−b , but in H 1 it is based on a dummy plaintext 0 ; from the smoothness property of the hash proof system, the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
Combining the three cases, we may deduce that the two hybrids H 0 and H 1 are statistically indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 2 : Similar to H 1 . The simulator Sim 2 works as follows:
Simulation of CRS. As in H 1 except that now compute (crs nizk , τ nizk ) ← S 1 (1 λ ).
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . As in H 1 .
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . As in H 1 .
The only difference between the above two hybrids is: in H 1 , the crs nizk is in the soundness mode while in H 2 it is in the ZK mode. Since the CRSs in two modes are computationally indistinguishable, we conclude that H 1 and H 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 3 : Similar to H 2 . The simulator Sim 3 works as follows:
Simulation of CRS. As in H 2 .
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . The simulator Sim 3 is the same as in H 2 except the following: in
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . As in H 2 . Now the only difference between the above two hybrids is: in H 2 , π is generated honestly, while in H 3 , π is simulated using the trapdoor τ nizk . In the ZK mode, the two proofs are statistically close. Therefore, we conclude that H 2 and H 3 are statistically indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 4 : Similar to H 3 . The simulator Sim 4 works as follows:
Simulation of CRS. As in H 3 .
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . The simulator Sim 4 is the same as in H 3 except the following: in M 1 = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π), now compute a dummy ciphertext Φ ← Enc pk (0). Note that here we still use the trapdoor τ nizk generate a simulated proof π.
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . As in H 3 .
Based on the CCA security of the encryption, we claim H 3 and H 4 are computationally indistinguishable. Towards contradiction, assume there exists a distinguisher Z who can distinguish H 3 from H 4 . We next show an adversary B that breaks the CCA-security of (Gen, Enc, Dec) as follows:
1. Upon receiving pk , B runs pp←HashPG(1 λ ) and (crs nizk , τ nizk )←S 1 (1 λ ); then, it sets crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ).
B then internally simulates Z as follows:
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . B works the same as in
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . As in H 3 except that whenever Z instructs A (in the name of receiver P j ) to send M 1 = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π) to sender P i , B queries its decryption oracle to obtain the plaintext of Φ (instead of using the secret key for pk ). Note that since the label (sid, ssid, P i , P j ) is unique, B can always use the decryption oracle for the given Φ. Therefore, both of the decryption behaviors are identical.
3. Finally, B outputs whatever Z outputs.
Let β be the hidden random bit embedded in the LR oracle. We note that when β = 0, B exactly simulates the hybrid H 3 to Z; when β = 1, B simulates exactly the hybrid H 4 to Z. Under the assumption that Z is able to distinguish the two hybrids in nonnegligible probability, then the constructed machine B is successful CCA attacker against (Gen, Enc, Dec), which is a contradiction. Therefore, H 3 and H 4 are computationally indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 5 : Similar to H 4 . The simulator Sim 5 works as follows:
Simulation of CRS. As in H 4 .
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . As in H 4 except that now in M 1 = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π), x 0 and x 1 are two yes instance. That is, (x 0 , w 0 ) ← SampYes(pp), and (x 1 , w 1 ) ← SampYes(pp).
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . As in H 4 .
The only difference is the in H 4 , C 1−b is a no instance while in H 5 it is a yes instance. Under the hard subset membership assumption, the two are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore, H 4 and H 5 are computationally indistinguishable.
Hybrid H 6 : Similar to H 5 except that in this hybrid, the input b of each honest receiver is not magically forwarded to the simulator any more. The simulator Sim 6 works as follows:
Simulation of CRS. As in H 5 .
Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i . The simulator Sim 6 is the same as in H 5 except the following: Upon receiving a second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 ) from the adversary A that intends to send from P i to P j , where M 2 = (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ), the simulator use w σ to computem σ = Z σ ⊕pHash(pk σ , x σ , w σ ) for all σ ∈ {0, 1}. Sim 6 sends (send, sid, ssid,
Simulating honest sender P i with corrupted receiver P j . As in H 5 .
Given the fact that the hash proof system is correct, H 5 and H 6 are identically distributed.
We conclude the proof by observing that Sim = Sim 6 .
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is very similar to that for the static case but with careful treatment of corruptions.
The Simulator
Initialization step: Same as the static case simulator in the proof of Theorem 1.
Simulating the communication with Z: Same as the static case simulator in the proof of Theorem 1.
2. Upon receiving (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from functionality F MOT , inform the adverary A that a message transfer over the secure channel took place.
Case 2: Simulating honest receiver P j with corrupted sender P i : Same as the static case simulator in the proof of Theorem 1.
Case 3: Simulating corrupted receiver P j with honest sender P i : Same as the static case simulator in the proof of Theorem 1.
Case 4: Simulating corrupted receiver P j with corrupted sender P i : Same as the static case simulator in the proof of Theorem 1.
Dealing with adaptive corruption of sender P i :
Before the second message. This case is equivalent to static corruption. That is, the simulator receives the original input (m 0 , m 1 ) and returns it to the adversary.
After the second message. The simulator receives the original input (m 0 , m 1 ).
• If the receiver P i is already corrupted (Case 3), at this moment, the second round message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) is fixed by the simulator itself. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the sender to the adversary, and it returns (m 0 , m 1 , pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
• Otherwise (Case 1), the simulator has to additionally generate the second round message. The simulator Sim computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕ Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the sender to the adversary, and it returns (m 0 , m 1 , pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
Depending on whether P j is honest, the simulator continues the simulation by following Case 2 (for honest P j ) or Case 4 (for corrupted P j ).
Dealing with adaptive corruption of receiver P j :
Before the first message. This case is equivalent to static corruption. That is, the simulator receives the original input b and returns it to the adversary.
Between the first message and the second. The simulator receives the original input b. It returns (b, w b , X, π) to the adversary A as P j 's internal state.
After the second message The simulator receives the original input b, and it obtains the receiver output m b .
• If the sender P i is already corrupted (Case 2), at this moment, the second round message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) is fixed either by the adversary A or by the simulator itself. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the receiver to the adversary, and it returns (b, w, X, π) and (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
• Otherwise (Case 1), the simulator has to additionally generate the second round message. The simulator Sim sets m 1−b = 0 , and computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕ Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the receiver to the adversary, and it returns (b, w, X, π) and (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
Note that in either case, it holds that
Depending on whether P i is honest, the simulator continues the simulation by following Case 3 (for honest P i ) or Case 4 (for corrupted P i ).
Indistinguishability
The change of simulation (from the static corruption model as to Theorem 1) lies only in the case where both parties are honest. In this case, the simulation is simpler since the protocol now uses a secure channel, and showing static security is easy. Therefore, the simulation shown above achieves static security. With that said, we only need to show that the internal state returned to the adversary upon adaptive corruption is indistinguishable from that in the real-world protocol.
Corrupting the sender. When the simulator returns (m 0 , m 1 , pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 0 ), the simulation is indistinguishable due to the hard subset membership property for x 1−b and the smoothness of the underlying hash proof system.
Corrupting the receiver. When the simulator returns (b, w b , X, π) to the adversary A (where X = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ)), the simulated internal state is indistinguishable due to the hard subset membership property for x 1−b and CCA security for Φ and zero-knowledge property for π. Even when the simulator additionally returns (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 0 ) to the adversary A, the simulation is indistinguishable (as with the sender corruption case).
4 Instantiations of Protocol 1 *
Instantiation from the DLIN Assumption
We show a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme, a smooth hash proof system, and a dual-mode NIZK proof system under the DLIN assumption. We then obtain a two-round OT protocol by combining these building blocks.
Decision Linear Assumption (DLIN)
Let G dlin a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs desc = (p, G, G T ,ê, g) such that
1. p is a prime.
2. G and G T are descriptions of groups of order p.
4. g is a random generator of G andê(g, g) generates G T .
5. Deciding group membership, group operations and the bilinear map are all efficiently computable.
The decisional linear assumption was first introduced by Boneh et al. [BBS04] . The decisional linear problem is to distinguish a linear tuple from a random tuple.
Definition 9 (Decisional Linear
Assumption) We say the decisional linear assumption holds for the bilinear group generator G dlin if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A it holds that |p 1 − p 2 | ≤ negl(λ), wherep 1 = Pr[(p, G, G T ,ê, g)←G dlin (1 λ ); x, y←Z * p ; r, s←Z p : A(p, G, G T ,ê, g, g x , g y , g xr , g ys , g r+s ) = 1] p 2 = Pr[(p, G, G T ,ê, g)←G dlin (1 λ ); x, y←Z * p ; r, s, d←Z p : A(p, G, G T ,ê, g, g x , g y , g xr , g ys , g d ) = 1].
CCA-Secure Labeled Public-Key Encryption Scheme
Based on the DLIN assumption, Shacham constructed a CCA-secure encryption called Linear Cramer-Shoup Encryption [Sha07] . As is done in [FLM11] , slightly changing the scheme to support labels leads to a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme: hash functions with stronger security of collision-resistance (rather than UOWHF) are used, and in the encryption algorithm, a given label is also applied to the hash function. Let desc←G dlin (1 λ ).
Key Generation (pk , sk )←Gen(desc): Choose random generators g 1 , g 2 ←G and exponents β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ←Z p and compute the following:
Choose a hash function H←HF where HF is a family of collision-resistant hash functions.
Encryption C ← Enc L pk (m; r): Given the message m ∈ G under label L, choose r 1 , r 2 ←Z p and compute u 1 = g
Here r = (r 1 , r 2 ) and C = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , e, v).
Decryption Dec L sk (C): Parse C = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , e, v) and sk = (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 , δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ); compute α←H(u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , e, L) and test if u 3 ).
Smooth Projective Hashing
Shacham showed a smooth projective hash proof system based on the DLIN assumption [Sha07] .
Parameter generation. Choose g 1 , g 2 ←G. The parameter is pp = (g 1 , g 2 , G) .
Instance
Projective hashing. Given a projective hash key pk = (f 1 , f 2 ), an instance x = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), and its witness w = (t 1 , t 2 ) such that z 1 = g
2 and z 3 = g t 1 +t 2 , return y = f
Non-Interactive Dual-Mode Zero-Knowledge Proof System
We simply note that the Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system [GS08] satisfies the required definition.
Here, we briefly outline only the part of the system that we need.
CRS. The common reference string consists of three vectors g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ G 3 , where 1, g ). In the soundness mode, g 3 is set as g 3 = g
with ζ 1 , ζ 2 ←Z * p . In the ZK mode, g 3 is set as g 3 = g
Under the DLIN assumption, the two kinds of CRS are indistinguishable.
Commit to an exponent. Committing to an exponent x ∈ Z p needs three group elements. In particular, the commitment is computed as C = g r 1 · g s 2 · h x 3 with r, s←Z * p . In the soundness mode, the commitment becomes (g
, g r+s+x(ζ 1 +ζ 2 ) · g x ), and it is perfectly binding, since it is a linear encryption of g x , which can be decrypted using a 1 = log g g 1 , a 2 = log g g 2 [BBS04] . In the ZK mode, it becomes C = (g
, g r+s+x(ζ 1 +ζ 2 ) ), and it is a perfectly hiding, since it is a random linear tuple for any x ∈ Z p .
Proving equations. Having the variables {x i } n i=1 with x i ∈ Z p committed using the above commitment scheme, various equations can be proved. In order to prove a linear equation such as
with known constants a i , b ∈ G, one needs two group elements in G. On the other hand, six group elements are needed in order to prove a quadratic equation in Z p that looks as follows:
with known constants a ij , b i , c ∈ Z p .
Oblivious Transfer
By plugging in these components into the generic framework for two-round OT, we obtain an OT protocol based on the DLIN assumption. Thus, it is only left to show how to concretely generate the proof π in the receiver side message given crs ot .
Protocol detail. Ignoring the description desc for the bilinear group, the common reference string is crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ), where pp = (g 1 , g 2 , g ), pk = (g 1 , g 2 , g, c 1 , c 2 , d 1 , d 2 , h 1 , h 2 , H) , crs nizk = (g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ) . Here, g 1 = (g 1 , 1, g ), g 2 = (1, g 2 , g ) and g 3 = (g 31 , g 32 , g 33 ) for some g 31 , g 32 , g 33 ∈ G. Therefore, the CRS can be represented with 12 group elements of G and one hash function index, along with the description of the bilinear group. Let x 0 = (z 01 , z 02 , z 03 ), x 1 = (z 11 , z 12 , z 13 ), and Φ = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , e, v) with α = H(u 1 , u 3 , u 3 , e, L), with L = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ). The proof π is a Groth-Sahai proof for the following variables and equations.
Variables: r 1 , r 2 , b, t 1 , t 2
The first five equations requires that Φ is a valid encryption of g b . From the sixth equation, it should hold that b ∈ {0, 1}. When b = 0, the last three equations require that the x 1 = (z 11 , z 12 , z 13 ) is a non-linear tuple (i.e., no-instance) with z 11 = g t 1 , z 12 = g t 2 , z 13 = g t 1 +t 2 +1 . On the other hand, when b = 1, x 0 should be a no-instance.
Communication complexity. The receiver message (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π) needs 3 + 3 + 5 + 37 = 48 group elements. (In particular, for the proof π five variables need to be committed (i.e., 15 = 5 · 3), and there are eight linear equations (i.e., 16 = 8 · 2) and one quadratic equation (i.e, 6 = 1 · 6).) The sender message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) needs 2 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 6 group elements. Therefore, the total communication complexity amounts to 54 group elements.
Adaptive security: realizing an adaptively secure channel. Note that the non-committing encryption given in [BH92] runs in three rounds and needs one public key and one ciphertext of a semantically secure public key encryption scheme. The first two rounds can be overlapped with the first round of the OT protocol, and thus the final OT protocol runs in three rounds. We can use linear encryption [BBS04] , and the communication overhead amounts to 5 group elements (the public key consists of two elements excluding the generator in the CRS, and the ciphertext consists of three elements).
Instantiation from the SXDH Assumption
We show a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme, a smooth hash proof system, and a dual-mode NIZK proof system under the SXDH assumption. We then obtain a two-round OT protocol by combining these building blocks.
Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SXDH)
Let G sxdh be a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs
2. G 1 , G 2 , and G T are descriptions of groups of order p.
3.ê :
4. g and g are random generators of G 1 and G 2 , andê(g, g ) generates G T .
Under the SXDH assumption [BBS04] , the DDH assumption holds in both G 1 and G 2 .
Definition 10 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption) We say the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption holds for the bilinear group generator G sxdh if for all nonuniform polynomial time adversaries A it holds that |p 10 − p 11 | = negl(λ) and |p 20 − p 21 | = negl(λ), where
Here, desc = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T ,ê, g, g ).
CCA-Secure Labeled Public-Key Encryption Scheme
Since the DDH assumption holds in G 1 , we can use Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] . As in the case for the DLIN assumption, we slightly change the scheme to support labels, that is, we use collision resistant hash functions instead of UOWHF and apply labels to hash functions when performing encryptions and decryptions. Let desc←G sxdh (1 λ ).
Key Generation (pk , sk )←Gen(desc): Choose random generators g 1 ←G 1 and exponents β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ←Z p and compute the following:
Choose a hash function H←HF where HF is a family of collision-resistant hash functions. Now set pk = (g 1 , g, c, d, h, H) and sk = (β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ).
Encryption C ← Enc L pk (m; r): Given the message m ∈ G under label L, choose r←Z p and compute the following: 
Smooth Projective Hashing
We recall the construction of smooth projective hashing based on the DDH assumption [CS98, CS02] .
Parameter Generation. Let g 1 be randomly chosen elements in G 1 . Then the parameter is pp = (g 1 , g, G 1 ).
Instance Sampling. To sample a yes instance, randomly choose t←Z p , and compute z 1 = g t 1 , z 2 = g t , and then return x = (z 1 , z 2 ).
To sample a no instance, randomly choose t←Z p , and then z 1 = g t 1 , z 2 = g t+1 , and then return x = (z 1 , z 2 ).
Hash Key Generation. Randomly choose θ 1 , θ 2 ←Z p and compute f = g
Return hk = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), and pk = f .
Primary Hashing Given a primary hash key hk = (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and an instance x = (z 1 , z 2 ), return
2 . Projective Hashing Given a projective hash key pk = f , an instance x = (z 1 , z 2 ), and its witness w = t such that z 1 = g t 1 , z 2 = g t , return y = f t .
Dual-Mode Zero-Knowledge Proof System
We simply note that the Groth-Sahai (GS) proof system [GS08] is indeed the case. Here, we briefly outline only the part of the system that we need.
CRS. The common reference string consists of two vectors g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 2 1 , where g 1 = (g, g α ). Let h 2 = g 2 · (1, g). In the soundness mode, g 2 is set as g 2 = g ζ 1 with ζ←Z * p . In the ZK mode, g 2 is set as g 2 = g ζ 1 · (1, g −1 ) with ζ←Z * p . Under the SXDH assumption, the two kinds of CRS are indistinguishable.
For group G 2 , we can define g 1 and g 2 similarly.
Commit to an exponent. Committing to an exponent x ∈ Z p needs two group elements. In particular, the commitment is computed as C = g r 1 · h x 2 with r←Z * p . In the soundness mode, the commitment becomes C = (g r+ζx , g α(r+ζx) · g x ), and it is perfectly binding, since it is an ElGamal encryption of g x , which can be decrypted using α. In the ZK mode, it becomes C = (g r+ζx , g α(r+ζx) ), and it is a perfectly hiding, since it is a random Diffie-Hellman tuple for any x ∈ Z p . We can also commit to an exponent using g 1 and g 2 in G 2 .
Proving equations. Having the variables {x i } n i=1 with x i ∈ Z p committed using G 1 and the variables {y j } n j=1 with y j ∈ Z p committed using G 2 using the above commitment scheme, various equations can be proved. In order to prove a linear equation that looks as follows
with known constants a i , b ∈ G 2 , one needs two group elements in G 1 . Similarly, for the linear equation
with known constants a j , b ∈ G 1 , one needs two group elements in G 2 . On the other hand, two group elements in G 1 and two group elements in G 2 are needed in order to prove a quadratic equation in Z p that looks as follows:
Oblivious Transfer
Now we are ready to describe the protocol based on the SXDH assumption.
CRS. Ignoring the description desc for the bilinear group, the common reference string crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ) is as follows:
Here, g 1 = (g, f 1 ), g 2 = (f 2 , f 3 ) for some f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ G 1 , and g 1 = (g , f 1 ), g 2 = (f 2 , f 3 ) for some g , f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ G 2 . Therefore, the CRS can be represented with 8 group elements of G 1 , 4 group elements of G 2 and one hash function index, along with the description of the bilinear group.
Protocol detail. It suffices to describe how to generate the proof for the receiver's message M 1 given crs ot = (pp, pk , crs nizk ). Let x 0 = (z 01 , z 02 ), x 1 = (z 11 , z 12 ), and Φ = (u 1 , u 2 , e, v) with α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e, (sid, ssid, P i , P j )). The proof π is a Groth-Sahai proof for the following variables and equations.
Variables committed using G 2 : r, b, t
Variables committed using G 1 : b
The first four equations requires that Φ is a valid encryption of g b . From the fifth equation and the sixth, it should hold that b ∈ {0, 1}. When b = 0, the last two equations require that the x 1 = (z 11 , z 12 ) is a non-Diffie-Hellman tuple (i.e., no-instance) with z 11 = g t 1 , z 12 = g t+1 2 . On the other hand, when b = 1, x 0 should be a no-instance.
Communication complexity. The receiver message (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) needs 2 + 2 + 4 = 8 group elements in G 1 . The proof π takes 6 elements in G 1 and 22 elements in G 2 . In particular, three variables need to be committed using G 2 (i.e., 6 = 3 · 2 in G 2 ), and one variable needs to be committed using G 1 (i.e., 2 = 1 · 2 in G 1 ). There are six linear equations (i.e., 12 = 6 · 2 in G 2 ) and two quadratic equations (i.e, 4 = 2 · 2 in G 1 and 4 = 2 · 2 in G 2 ). The sender message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) needs (1, 1, 1, 1) = 4 group elements in G 1 . Therefore, the total communication complexity amounts to 18 group elements in G 1 and 22 group elements in G 2 .
Adaptive security: realizing an adaptively secure channel. Note that the non-committing encryption given in [BH92] runs in three rounds and needs one public key and one ciphertext of a semantically secure public key encryption scheme. The first two rounds can be overlapped with the first round of the OT protocol, and thus the final OT protocol runs in three rounds. We can use ElGamal encryption, and the communication overhead amounts to 3 group elements (the public key consists of one element excluding the generator in the CRS, and the ciphertext consists of two elements).
A Generic Framework for Four-Round OT
In this section, we describe a generic framework for constructing four-round OT protocols. We begin by looking at the case of static security, and then show how the ideas can be extended to achieve security against adaptive adversaries.
Static Security (Protocol 2)
The main idea is to adapt our previous two-round framework by replacing the dual-mode NIZK proof with an interactive equivalent. In particular, the general structure of the protocol is as follows: the protocol starts by having the receiver send two instances (x 0 , x 1 ) for hash proof system where x 1−b being a no-instance; also, in protection against a malicious behavior, Enc pk (b) and a Sigma protocol (augmented with an equivocal commitment) are attached. Then, the sender generates primary and projective hash keys (hk σ , pk σ ) for each instance x σ and sends (pk σ , Hash(hk σ , x σ )⊕m σ ) to the receiver. The security can be shown similarly to the two-round OT case.
Here, instead of replicating all the details, we only describe how to combine a Sigma protocol with an equivocal commitment scheme in order to replace the NIZK part. The idea is having the prover commit to the first round message of the Sigma protocol, and reveal it in the third round. Refer to Figure 5 for the overall pictorial description of the protocol.
CRS.
Compute pp←HashPG(1 λ ), (pk , sk )←Gen(1 λ ), and crs com ←K com (1 λ ). The common reference string is crs ot = (pp, pk , crs com ).
Com crscom (a; r) Replacing NIZK. Recall in the two-round OT case, the receiver generates a NIZK π to prove that (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) is valid message, i.e., Φ is an encryption of b ∈ {0, 1} for some b and x 1−b is noinstance. In this protocol, the receiver proves it by running a Sigma protocol (P Σ , V Σ ), along with an equivocal commitment scheme (K com , Com), with respect to the following language:
where L = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ).
1. The receiver runs a←P Σ ((pp, pk , L, x 0 , x 1 , Φ), (b, γ, ξ)), and c = Com crscom (a; r) with r chosen uniformly at random. It sends (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, c).
2. The sender sends the challenge message e←{0, 1} λ of the Sigma protocol.
3. Upon receiving the challenge e, the receiver generates an answer by running
It sends the sender the answer z along with the opening of the commitment, i.e., ((a, r), z).
4.
The sender verifies (a, e, z) is an accepting transcript and (a, r) is a valid opening of c:
The security of the protocol can be proved similarly to the two-round case.
erase all state except (b, w, X, a, r, z)
Com crscom ((X, a); r)
Figure 6: An adaptively secure OT protocol in the F CRS -hybrid model (Protocol 2 * ). The last round message is sent over a secure channel.
Theorem 3 Say (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme, (HashPG, SampYes, SampNo, HashKG, Hash, pHash) is a smooth projective hash proof system with hard subset membership property, (P Σ , V Σ ) is a Σ-protocol, and (K com , Com) is an equivocal commitment scheme. Then the protocol of Figure 5 securely realizes F MOT in the F CRS -hybrid model, for static corruptions.
The proof appears in Section 5.3.
Adaptive Security (Protocol 2 * )
As with the 2-round framework, the protocol first needs to be changed so that the last round message is sent over a secure channel. This modification (along with erasing the state appropriately), however, is not sufficient to deal with adaptive corruption in the four-round case. For the NIZK, the receiver can generate π and then erase the unnecessary internal state before sending out (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π). However, if the statement is composed with the interactive Sigma protocol, some of the internal state cannot be erased until the last move. For example, in the Sigma protocol, the receiver cannot erase the randomness used for generating the no-instance x 1−b until it receives the challenge e, since he has to use the randomness as part of the witness in order to finish the proof. However, recall that both x 0 and x 1 are yes instances in simulation; when the adversary corrupts the receiver right before sending e, the simulator cannot return a valid randomness for x 1−b , and so the simulation breaks down.
Changing the order of messages. As in the commitment scheme [Lin11] , we resolve this issue by switching the order of messages. That is, the message to be committed to is not only the first message a of the Sigma protocol but also the statement itself (i.e., (x 0 , x 1 , Φ)), and they are revealed at the last move of the Sigma protocol. Now, thanks to the equivocality of the commitment scheme, the protocol can achieve adaptive security. Refer to Figure 6 for the overall pictorial description.
Here, we only describe the aforementioned modification in more detail. Recall in the statically secure protocol described in Section 5.1, the receiver sends (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) and the commitment c to the first message a of the Sigma protocol (P Σ , V Σ ) for the language
where L = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ). In this protocol, we change the order of messages as follows:
1. The receiver runs a←P Σ ((pp, pk , L, x 0 , x 1 , Φ), (b, γ, ξ)), and c←Com crscom ((x 0 , x 1 , Φ, a); r) with r chosen uniformly at random. It sends c.
It sends the sender the answer z along with the opening of the commitment, i.e., ((x 0 , x 1 , Φ, a), r, z).
4.
The sender verifies (a, e, z) is an accepting transcript and ((x 0 , x 1 , Φ, a), r) is a valid opening of c:
Theorem 4 Under the same assumptions as Theorem 3, the protocol in Figure 6 securely realizes F MOT in the F CRS -hybrid model, for adaptive corruptions (assuming erasure).
The proof appears in Section 5.4.
Proof of Theorem 3

The Simulator
The simulator is very similar to that in the two round case. Let Π denote the OT protocol under consideration. Here we construct a simulator Sim for any non-uniform ppt environment Z such that exec
where A is the dummy adversary. Then we argue the indistinguishability between the two ensembles. Let (S com1 , S com2 , S com3 ) be the simulator for the dual-mode equivocal commitment (K com , Com), and S Σ is the simulator for the Sigma protocol.
Initialization step:
The simulator Sim generates the common reference string as follows:
4. Set crs ot = (pp, pk , crs com ).
Simulating the communication with Z: Same as the simulator in the proof of Theorem 1.
Generate two yes instances, i.e, (x 0 , w 0 ) ← SampYes(pp), (x 1 , w 1 ) ← SampYes(pp), and record (w 0 , w 1 ). Compute a dummy ciphertext Φ ← Enc pk (0), and then run (c, ξ)←S com2 (τ ).
2. Upon receiving a first round message (sid, ssid, M 1 ) from A that it intends to send from P j to P i , the simulator randomly chooses e, and sends A the second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 = e).
3. Upon receiving the second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 = e) from A that intends to send from P i to P j , the simulator sends A a third round message (sid, ssid, M 3 ) that intends to send from P j to P i , where X = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) and M 3 = (a, r, z) which are generated as follows:
Run S Σ for the Sigma protocol, i.e., compute (a, z)←S Σ ((pp, pk , L, X), e). After that the simulator runs S com3 to obtain r, i.e., compute r←S com3 (ξ, a).
4. Upon receiving (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from functionality F MOT , and the third round message has been delivered from P j to P i , the simulator Sim then sets m 0 = m 1 = 0 , and computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ← Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}, and generates a fourth round message (sid, ssid, M 4 ) that it intends to send from P i to P j , where M 4 = (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ). The fourth round message (sid, ssid, M 4 ) is then delivered to A.
2. Upon receiving the second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 = e) from A that intends to send from P i to P j , the simulator sends A a third round message (sid, ssid, M 3 ) that intends to send from P j to P i , where M 3 = (a, r, z) is generated as follows:
3. Upon receiving a fourth round message (sid, ssid, M 4 ) from the adversary A that intends to send from P i to P j , where M 4 = (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ), the simulator use (w 0 , w 1 ) to computem 0 = Z 0 ⊕pHash(pk 1 , x 0 , w 0 ) andm 1 = Z 1 ⊕pHash(pk 1 , x 1 , w 1 ). The simulator Sim sends (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j , m 0 ,m 1 ) to F MOT .
1. Upon receiving a first round message (sid, ssid, M 1 ) from A that it intends to send from P j to P i , where M 1 = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, c), the simulator randomly chooses e, and sends A the second round message (sid, ssid, M 2 = e).
2. Upon receiving a third round message (sid, ssid, M 3 ) with M 3 = (a, r, z) from A that intends to send from P j to P i the simulator Sim verifies (a, e, z) is an accepting transcript and (a, r) is a valid opening of c:
If the verification fails, then Sim aborts; otherwise, Sim decrypts Φ intob, i.e.,b = Dec L sk (Φ) with L = (sid, ssid, P i , P j ). Ifb ∈ {0, 1}, Sim aborts. 3. Upon receiving (send, sid, ssid, P i , P j ) from functionality F MOT , the simulator Sim then sends (receive, sid, ssid, P i , P j ,b) to the ideal functionality F MOT in the name of dummy receiver and obtains (received, sid, ssid, P i , P j , mb). Set m 1−b = 0 . Then the simulator computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}, and sends a fourth round message (sid, ssid, M 4 ) to A that it intends to send from P i to P j , where M 4 = (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
Indistinguishability
The proof is quite similar to the two-round case, and thus we highlight only the differences. As before, we show indistinguishability by following the same series of the hybrids as the two-round OT case.
• H 2 : Use a simulated crs com (note that, in the two-round OT case, it was using a simulated crs nizk ).
• H 3 : In simulating honest receivers, the simulator generates a fake commitment c as well as fake Sigma protocol transcript (a, r, z) (note that in the two-round OT case, the simulator generates a simulated NIZK proof).
The simulator is very similar to that in the two-round OT case except in simulating the proof. There, the simulator generates a fake NIZK proof, while here the simulator needs to generate a fake interactive proof (Sigma protocol along with a commitment). Since we only changed the proofsimulation part, it suffices to show the indistinguishability from H 0 to H 3 . The rest is the same as the two-round OT.
H 0 ≈ H 1 . As in the two-round OT, we consider the following cases:
Case (I). The proof is accepting, i.e., V Σ ((pp, pk , L, x 0 , x 1 , Φ), a, e, z) = 1 and Com crscom (a; r) = c, the ciphertext Φ correctly decrypts to some valueb ∈ {0, 1}, and x 1−b is a yes instance.
Case (II).
The proof is not accepting. In this case, the sender in both H 0 and H 1 will abort, so H 0 and H 1 are identically distributed.
Case (III).
The proof is accepting and x 1−b is a no instance. In this case, the only difference between the distributions H 0 and H 1 is that in H 0 , Z 1−b is honestly generated based on the real plaintext m 1−b , but in H 1 it is based on a dummy plaintext 0 ; from the smoothness property of the hash proof system, the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
Having these three cases in mind, next in order to show the two hybrids H 0 and H 1 are indistinguishable, we just need to argue that Case (I) occurs with negligible probability. Suppose there exists an environment Z that distinguishes H 0 and H 1 with non-negligible probability. This means that with Z, the probability that Case (I) occurs is non-negligible. Without loss of generality, we assume Z is deterministic. Then, we can construct an adversary B that breaks the binding property of the equivocal commitment scheme (K com , Com). In particular, the adversary B works as follows:
B is given crs com , and it tries to come up with a commitment that opens to two different messages as follows.
1. B runs pp←HashPG(1 λ ) and (pk , sk )←Gen(1 λ ) and sets crs ot = (pp, pk , crs com ).
2. B exactly follows the specification H 0 while interacting with Z.
3. Once Z finishes execution, B randomly chooses a sub-session among the subsessions with an accepting transcript that Z invoked during the execution.
4. Let (c, (a, r), e, z) be the accepting transcript of the chosen sub-session ssid. Now, B rewinds Z to the point right before sending e, and it resumes the protocol execution by sending e ←{0, 1} λ instead of e in sub-session ssid. If Z generates another accepting transcript (c, (a , r ), e , z ) with a = a , B outputs (c, (a, r), (a , r )); otherwise B outputs ⊥.
Let δ be the probability that Case (I) occurs. Then, the probability that Case (I) occurs in the chosen session ssid is at least δ/T , where T is the maximum number of sub-sessions that Z initiates. Now, conditioned that the chosen session contains a false statement, the probability that Z outputs another accepting transcript (c, (a , r ), e , z ) is δ, since e is also chosen uniformly at random. Now consider the special soundness of the Sigma protocol: the statement is false, so there is only one accepting challenge (i.e., e) for a. Therefore, e = e implies a = a . Considering the event e = e happens with probability 1 − 2 λ , we conclude that B outputs a commitment along with two different openings with non-negligible probability of at least (1 − 2 −λ )δ 2 /T .
) be the simulator for the equivocal commitment scheme (K com , Com). In H 2 , the CRS for the commitment scheme is generated as follows:
The indistinguishability simply holds from the security definition of the equivocal commitment scheme.
In the interactive setting, the simulation for the zero-knowledge proof goes as follows:
1. Let S Σ be the simulator for the Sigma protocol (P Σ , V Σ ). Let X = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) be the statement to prove.
2. Run (c, ξ)←S com2 (τ ), and send c (along with (x 0 , x 1 , Φ)) to the adversary.
3. Upon receiving the challenger e, run (a, z)←S Σ ((pp, pk , L, X), e) and r←S com3 (ξ, a); send ((a, r), z) to the adversary.
From the special honest zero-knowledge property of the Sigma protocol, (a, e, z) are statistically indistinguishable to the original transcript, and from the equivocality property of the commitment scheme (c, a, r) is identically distributed to the original transcript. Therefore, H 2 and H 3 are statistically indistinguishable.
Proof of Theorem 4
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3 but with careful treatment of corruptions. Here we construct a simulator Sim for any non-uniform ppt environment Z such that exec
where A is the dummy adversary. Then we argue the indistinguishability between the two ensembles. Let (S com1 , S com2 , S com3 ) be the simulator for the equivocal commitment (K com , Com), and S Σ is the simulator for the Sigma protocol.
The Simulator
Initialization step: Same as the simulator in the proof of Theorem 3.
Simulating the communication with Z: Same as the simulator in the proof of Theorem 3.
Between the second message and the fourth. Likewise, the simulator receives the original input (m 0 , m 1 ), and return (m 0 , m 1 , e) to the adversary A as P i 's internal state.
After the fourth message. The simulator receives the original input (m 0 , m 1 ).
• If the receiver P i is already corrupted (Case 3), at this moment, the last round message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) is fixed by the simulator itself. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the sender to the adversary, and it returns (m 0 , m 1 , pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
• Otherwise (Case 1), the simulator has to additionally generate the last round message. The simulator Sim computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕ Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the sender to the adversary, and it returns (m 0 , m 1 , pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
Between the first message and the second. The simulator receives the original input b. The simulator then computes X = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) honestly and record witness (b, γ, ξ), and then generates a honestly i.e. a←P Σ ((pp, pk , L, X), (b, γ, ξ)). At this point, the simulator runs r←S com3 (c, (X, a)), and return all internal state, i.e., (b, X, γ, ξ, a, r) to the adversary A.
Between the second message and the third. The simulator receives the original input b. The simulator then computes X = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) honestly and record witness W , and then generates a, z honestly i.e. a←P Σ ((pp, pk , L, X), (b, γ, ξ)), z←P Σ ((pp, pk , L, X), (b, γ, ξ), e). At this point, the simulator runs r←S com3 (c, (X, a)), and returns (b, w, X, a, r, z) to the adversary A as P j 's internal state.
Between the third message and the fourth. The simulator receives the original input b, and returns (b, w b , X, a, r, z) to the adversary A as P j 's internal state.
After the fourth message. The simulator receives the original input b and the output m b .
• If the sender P i is already corrupted (Case 2), at this moment, the last round message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) is fixed either by the adversary A or by the simulator itself. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the receiver to the adversary, and it returns (b, w b , X, a, r, z) and (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
• Otherwise (Case 1), the simulator has to additionally generate the last round message. The simulator Sim sets m 1−b = 0 , and computes (hk σ , pk σ ) ← HashKG(pp), Z σ = m σ ⊕ Hash(hk σ , x σ ) for σ ∈ {0, 1}. Now the simulator has to return the internal state of the receiver to the adversary, and it returns (b, w b , X, a, r, z) and (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ).
Note that in either case, it holds that m b = Z b ⊕pHash(pk b , x b , w).
Indistinguishability
The proof is quite similar to that of Theorem 3. We follow the same series of the hybrids as before.
• H 2 : Use a simulated crs com .
• H 3 : In simulating honest receivers, the simulator generates a simulated Sigma protocol transcript and a fake commitment c.
Since we only changed the proof part, it suffices to show the indistinguishability from H 0 to H 3 . The rest are the same as the two-round OT.
As in the two-round OT, we consider the following cases:
Case (I). The proof is accepting, i.e., V Σ ((pp, pk , L, x 0 , x 1 , Φ), a, e, z) = 1 and Com crscom (a; r) = c, and the ciphertext Φ correctly decrypts to some valueb ∈ {0, 1}, and x 1−b is a yes instance.
Case (II).
Case (III).
Having these three cases in mind, suppose there exists an environment Z that distinguishes H 0 and H 1 with non-negligible probability. This means that with Z, the probability that Case (I) occurs is non-negligible. Without loss of generality, we assume Z is deterministic. Then, we can construct an adversary B that breaks the binding property of the equivocal commitment scheme (K com , Com). In particular, the adversary B works as follows:
4. Let (c, (X, a, r), e, z) be the accepting transcript of the chosen sub-session ssid * . Now, B rewinds Z to the point right before sending e, and it resumes the protocol execution by sending e ←{0, 1} λ instead of e in sub-session ssid. If Z generates another accepting transcript (c, (X , a , r ), e , z ) with (X, a) = (X , a ), B outputs (c, ((X, a), r), ((X , a ), r )); otherwise B outputs ⊥.
Let Diff(ssid) be a predicate for a given session ssid that is defined to be true if the sub-session ssid satisfies the following conditions:
• The sender is honest.
• The receiver is corrupted.
• Case (I) occurs.
Let Pr[∃ssid s.t. Diff(ssid) = 1] = δ. By assumption, the probability δ is non-negligible. Then, the probability that Diff(ssid * ) is true for the chosen session ssid * is at least δ/T , where T is the maximum number of sub-sessions that Z initiates. Now, conditioned that Diff is true for the chosen session ssid * , the probability that Z outputs another accepting transcript (c, (X , a , r ), e , z ), with Diff(ssid * ) = 1, is δ/T ; the challenge e is also chosen uniformly at random. Now consider the special soundness of the Sigma protocol: the statement is false, so there is only one accepting challenge (i.e., e) for a. Therefore, e = e implies (X, a) = (X , a ). Considering the event e = e happens with probability 1 − 2 λ , we conclude that B outputs a commitment along with two different openings with non-negligible probability of at least (1 − 2 −λ )(δ/T ) 2 .
1. Let S Σ be the simulator for the Sigma protocol (P Σ , V Σ ). The statement to be proven is (pp, pk , L, X) where X = (x 0 , x 1 , Φ).
2. Run (c, ξ)←S com2 (τ ), and send c to the adversary.
3. Upon receiving the challenger e, run (a, z)←S Σ ((pp, pk , L, X), e) and r←S com (ξ, (X, a)); send ((X, a), r, z) to the adversary.
Dealing with Corruptions
We are left to show that the internal state returned to the adversary upon adaptive corruption is indistinguishable from that in the real-world protocol.
Dealing with adaptive corruption of sender P i .
Before the second message. The simulation is simply perfect, since there has been no simulated protocol transcript so far in the given sub-session.
Between the second message and the fourth. The simulated value e is uniform; so the simulation is perfect.
After the fourth message. Since the adversary is given only the erased state (m 0 , m 1 , pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ), the simulation is indististinguisahble to the real-world execution due to the hard-subset membership property and the smoothness of the underlying hash proof system.
Dealing with adaptive corruption of receiver P j .
Before the first message. The simulation is simply perfect, since there has been no simulated protocol transcript so far in the given sub-session.
Between the first message and the second. From the perfect hiding property of the commitment scheme, the simulation is perfect.
Between the second message and the third. From the perfect hiding property of the commitment scheme, the simulation is perfect.
Between the third message and the fourth. Note that (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) in the simulated transcript is such that x 1−b is a yes instance, and Φ = Enc(0). However, since the adversary is given only the erased state (b, w b , X, a, r, z), the simulation is indistinguishable from the real-world execution due to the hard subset membership property for x 1−b and CCA security for Φ and zeroknowledge property for Sigma protocol.
After the fourth message. Indistinguishability for simulating (b, w b , X, a, r, z) holds as in the above case. Even when the simulator additionally returns (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 0 ) to the adversary A, the simulation is indistinguishable (as with the sender corruption case).
6 Instantiations of Protocol 2 and Protocol 2 *
Instantiation from the DDH Assumption
We show a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme, a smooth hash proof system, and an equivocal commitment scheme under the DDH assumption. We then obtain a four-round OT protocol by combining these building blocks.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let G ddh be a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ and outputs desc = (p, G, g) such that G is the description of group of prime order p, and g is a generator of G.
Definition 11 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption) The DDH problem is hard relative to G if for all ppt algorithms A there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
where in each case the probabilities are taken over the experiment in which the group-generating algorithm outputs (G, p, g) and random a, b, c ∈ Z p are chosen.
CCA-Secure Labeled Public-Key Encryption Scheme
Since the DDH assumption holds in G 1 , we can use Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] . As in the case for the DLIN assumption, we slightly change the scheme to support labels, that is, we use collision resistant hash functions instead of UOWHF and apply labels to hash functions when performing encryptions and decryptions.
Key generation (pk , sk )←Gen(desc): Choose random generators g 1 ←G and exponents β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ←Z p and compute c = g
Choose a hash function H←HF where HF is a family of collision-resistant hash functions. Now set pk = (g 1 , g, c, d , h, H) and sk = (β 1 , β 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 , δ 1 , δ 2 ).
2 ).
Smooth Projective Hashing
We recall the smooth projective hashing based on the DDH assumption [CS98, CS02] .
Parameter generation. Choose g 1 , g←G. Then pp = (g 1 , g, G) .
Instance sampling. To sample a yes instance, choose t←Z p , and compute z 1 = g t 1 , z 2 = g t , and then return x = (z 1 , z 2 ). To sample a no instance, choose t←Z p , and then z 1 = g t 1 , z 2 = g t+1 , and then return x = (z 1 , z 2 ).
Hash key generation. Choose θ 1 , θ 2 ←Z p and compute f = g
Return hk = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), and pk = f . Primary hashing. Given hk = (θ 1 , θ 2 ) and x = (z 1 , z 2 ), return y = z
Projective hashing. Given a projective hash key pk = f , an instance x = (z 1 , z 2 ), and its witness w = t such that z 1 = g t 1 , z 2 = g t , return y = f t .
Equivocal Commitment
We use a variant of the famous equivocal commitment by Pedersen [Ped92] . The main difference from the original Pedersen commitment is that collision resilient hash function H : {0, 1} * →Z p is used to commit to arbitrary long message very efficiently. In particular, given the CRS (g, h 1 ) ∈ G 2 , the commitment to a message m is g r h H(m) 1
. We note that the binding property is under the DLOG assumption and the collision resilient property of the hash function. When a trapdoor ζ with h 1 = g ζ is known, it easy to equivocate a commitment c = g s into any m by outputting r = s − ζ · H(m).
Oblivious Transfer
By plugging in these components into the generic framework for four-round OT, we obtain an OT protocol based on the DDH assumption. Thus, it is only left to show the concrete Sigma protocol that is used in the receiver side message.
Protocol detail. Ignoring the description desc of the group G, the CRS is crs ot = (pp, pk , crs com ) where pp = (g 1 , g) pk = (g 1 , g, c, d, h, H) crs com = (h 1 , g) . Therefore, the CRS can be represented with 6 group elements of G and one hash function index, along with the description of the group G.
Let x 0 = (z 01 , z 02 ), x 1 = (z 11 , z 12 ), and Φ = (u 1 , u 2 , e, v) with α = H(u 1 , u 2 , e, (sid, ssid, P i , P j )). Then, we use a standard Sigma protocol for the following language:
The prover chooses R, T ←Z p , η←[0, 2 λ ), and ρ, τ ←Z p . Then, it computes and sends the verifier the following:
2. The verifier chooses ←[0, 2 λ ) and sends it to the prover.
3. The prover computes the following:
Then, it sends ( 0 , ρ 0 , τ 0 , ρ 1 , τ 1 ) to the verifier.
4. The verifier computes 1 = − 0 mod 2 λ . It also checks if the following holds for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Communication complexity. The receiver message (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) needs 2 + 2 + 4 = 8 group elements. The proof takes 13 elements in G and 7 elements in Z p . In particular, the first message has one commitment (i.e., 1 element in G). The second message has 1 element in Z p 3 , and the third messages has 5 elements in Z p along with the decommitment (i.e., 12 elements in G and 1 element in Z p ). The sender message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) needs (1, 1, 1, 1) = 4 group elements in G. Therefore, the total communication complexity amounts to 25 elements in G and 7 elements in Z p .
Adaptive security: realizing an adaptively secure channel. Note that the non-committing encryption given in [BH92] runs in three rounds and needs one public key and one ciphertext of a semantically secure public key encryption scheme. The NCE protocol messages can be overlapped with the OT protocol messages, and thus the final OT protocol runs in four rounds. We can use ElGamal encryption, and the communication overhead amounts to 3 group elements (the public key consists of one element excluding the generator in the CRS, and the ciphertext consists of two elements).
Instantiation from the DCR Assumption
We show a CCA-secure labeled public-key encryption scheme, a smooth hash proof system, and an equivocal commitment under the DCR assumption. We then obtain a four-round OT protocol by combining these building blocks.
Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCR)
Let N be a Blum integer, i.e., N = P Q for safe primes P, Q ≡ 3 mod 4 so that P = 2p + 1 and Q = 2q+1 for primes p, q. The decision composite residuosity (DCR) assumption [Pai99] states that given N , it is hard to distinguish random elements from Z * N 2 from random N -th power elements in Z * N 2 . Let Primes(λ) denote the set of prime numbers between 2 λ and 2 λ+1 . 
CCA-Secure Labeled Public-Key Encryption Scheme
We use the variant of Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme [CS03] described in [HK12] .
Key Generation Choose p, q←Primes(λ) and compute N = P Q where P = 2p+1 and Q = 2q+1. Choose g ←Z * N 2 and β, γ, δ←[N 2 /4], and compute the following:
Choose a hash function H←HF where HF is a family of collision-resistant hash functions. Now set pk = (N, g, c, d, h, H) and sk = (β, γ, δ). If so, output (z − 1)/N ; otherwise output reject.
Smooth Projective Hashing
We use the smooth projective hashing scheme described in [HK12] .
Parameter Generation. Choose two random prime numbers p, q←Primes(λ) and compute N = P Q, where P = 2p + 1, Q = 2q + 1. Choose g ←Z * N 2 and compute g 1 = (g ) N mod N 2 . Then the parameter is pp = (N, g 1 ) .
Instance Sampling. Randomly choose w←Z * N . For a yes instance, set x = g w 1 mod N 2 and return (x, w); for a no instance, return x = g w 1 · (1 + N ) mod N 2 .
Hash Key Generation. Randomly choose θ←Z N and compute f = g θ 1 mod N 2 . Return hk = θ, and pk = f .
Primary Hashing Given a primary hash key hk = θ and an instance x, return y = x θ mod N 2 .
Projective Hashing Given a projective hash key pk = f , an instance x, and its witness w such that x = g w 1 , return y = f w mod N 2 .
Equivocal Commitment
CRS generation: The common reference string consists of (N, g). Here, N = P Q and P = 2p+1, Q = 2q + 1 where p, q←Primes(λ). g = (g ) N mod N 2 , where g ←Z * N is the equivocation trapdoor.
Committing: To commit a value m, randomly choose r ∈ Z * N . The commitment value is c = g H(m) r N mod N 2 , and the decommitment value is (m, r).
Equivocation: In the committing stage, the simulation algorithm S com2 chooses s←Z * N and outputs s N mod N 2 . Given a message m, the equivocation algorithm S com3 computes r = (g ) −H(m) s mod N . Observe that g H(m) r N = ((g ) N ) H(m) ((g ) −H(m) s) N = s N mod N 2 .
Oblivious Transfer
Now we are ready to describe the protocol based on the DCR assumption.
CRS. The reference string crs ot = (pp, pk , crs com ) is as follows: pp = (N, g 1 ) pk = (N, g, c, d, h, H) crs com = (N, g) Protocol detail. It suffices to describe how to generate the proof in the receiver side message M 1 given crs ot = (pp, pk , crs com ). Let Φ = (u, e, v) with α = H(u, e, (sid, ssid, P i , P j )). We show a Sigma protocol for the following language:
(crs ot , x 0 , x 1 , Φ, α) : ∃(r, t) s.t.
(u = g r , e = h r , v 2 = (cd α ) 2r , x 1 = g t 1 · (1 + N )) or (u = g r , e = (1 + N )h r , v 2 = (cd α ) 2r , x 0 = g t 1 · (1 + N ) )
The concrete Sigma protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The prover chooses R, T ←Z N , η←[1, 2 λ ), and ρ, τ, ←Z N . Letb = 1 − b. Then, it computes and send the verifier the following:
2. The verifier chooses ←[1, 2 λ ) and sends it to the prover.
Then, it sends 0 , and {ρ i , τ i } i∈{0,1} to the verifier.
Communication complexity. We will count a value in [0, 2 λ ) as one element in Z N . Consider the receiver message (x 0 , x 1 , Φ, π). Firstly, the part (x 0 , x 1 , Φ) amounts to 5 = 1 + 1 + 3 elements in Z N 2 . For the Sigma protocol for π, the first message has one elements in Z N 2 , the second message has one element in {0, 1} λ , and the third message has one element in {0, 1} λ and four elements in Z N , along with the decommitment with eight elements in Z N 2 and one element in Z N . Thus, communication complexity for the proof π amounts to 9 = 1 + 8 elements in Z N 2 and 7 = 1 + (1 + 4 + 1)) elements in Z N . The sender message (pk 0 , Z 0 , pk 1 , Z 1 ) needs (1, 1, 1, 1) = 4 group elements in Z N 2 . Therefore, the total communication complexity amounts to 18 elements in Z N 2 and 7 elements in Z N .
Adaptive security: realizing an adaptively secure channel. Note that the non-committing encryption given in [BH92] runs in three rounds and needs one public key and one ciphertext of a semantically secure public key encryption scheme. The NCE protocol messages can be overlapped with the OT protocol messages, and thus the final OT protocol runs in four rounds. We can use the variant of Camenisch-Shoup encryption scheme [CS03] described in [HK12] (we don't need the last checking element for semantic security) and the communication overhead amounts to 3 group elements in Z N 2 (the public key consists of one element excluding the generator in the CRS, and the ciphertext consists of two elements).
A.1 DDH-Based Construction
We first consider the instantiation under the DDH assumption. The CRS in the PVW protocol is (g, h, c, d). We can put (g, h) in the CRS, and use coin flipping only to determine (c, d). This requires UC commitments to two group elements. We use Lindell's commitment scheme [Lin11] .
Static case. We start with the protocol with static security.
CRS size is seven. The commitment scheme needs seven group elements for the CRS. We can reuse them for the CRS of the PVW protocol.
Round complexity is six. The commitment scheme needs one round for committing and four rounds for opening. However, the second message of the coin-tossing protocol can be overlapped with one of the four rounds in the opening. This implies that the coin-tossing stage needs five rounds. The PVW protocol needs two rounds, but the last round of the coin-tossing protocol and the first round of PVW protocol can also be overlapped. Overall, the round complexity is six.
Communication complexity is 38. The commitment and the proof part of the opening requires 14 group elements [FLM11, Table 1 ]. Recall that we need two random group elements from the coin-tossing protocol. Therefore, considering the committed messages themselves and the second move of the coin-tossing protocol, communication complexity of the coin tossing protocol is 32 = 2(14 + 1 + 1). The PVW protocol has communication complexity of 6. Overall, the communication complexity is 38.
Adaptive case. The CRS size remains the same as the static case. We consider the other measures.
Round complexity is eight. In the adaptive case, we don't know whether the protocol remains secure once we overlap the messages in the same round. Therefore, the round complexity is eight.
Communication complexity is 48. For the adaptive case, the commitment and the proof part of the opening requires 19 group elements [FLM11, Table 1 ]. This implies that the communication complexity increases by 10 elements.
Realizing an adaptively secure channel. Note that the non-committing encryption given in [BH92] runs in three rounds and needs one public key and one ciphertext of a semantically secure public key encryption scheme. The NCE protocol messages can be overlapped with the OT protocol messages. We can use ElGamal encryption, and the communication overhead amounts to 3 group elements (the public key consists of one element excluding the generator in the CRS, and the ciphertext consists of two elements).
A.2 DLIN-Based Construction
Now, we consider the instantiation under the DLIN assumption. The commitment of the GrothSahai proof can be adapted to the PVW protocol. We first recall the Groth-Sahai commitment.
